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Abstract
The high level of debt among households outside the top end of the income distribution has led many economists to assert that household debt has been an
important component of the increase in income inequality in the United States.
In addition, the yield spread provides information about the overall condition
of the economy and may also be tied into the distribution of income. The
paper's results show that increases in the yield spread and household debt correspond with increases in top income shares, resulting in increases in income
inequality. However, as household debt and income inequality increase, the
yield spread contracts, which suggests future economic contraction. Thus, rising inequality may signal future economic weakness.
KEYWORDS
economic growth, household debt, income inequality

1 | INTRODUCTION
U.S. household debt relative to income has increased significantly over the last century. As shown in Figure 1, the
largest increase occurred during the years prior to the
Great Recession, particularly during the years 2006 and
2007, where debt was at its peak level of 130% of household income.
The increase primarily represents households'
attempts to smooth consumption over time on the expectation of increases in future income (Dynan & Kohn
2007). Similarly, Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2015) have suggested that over‐optimistic expectations about the future
are likely to contribute to credit demand by households.
Thus, observing the high leverage ratio of households
has led many economists to explore the role debt plays
in driving overall macroeconomic conditions. Mian et al.
*
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(2015) show that household debt matters for subsequent
changes in economic conditions. Growth in household
debt over a 3‐ to 4‐year period predicts subsequently lower
output growth and increases in unemployment. Cecchetti,
Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) document that borrowing
can be beneficial as long as it is modest. However, at high
levels, debt increases volatility and impedes growth.
It should be noted that the overall increase in the
household debt level observed from the data was mainly
concentrated among the households outside the top of
the income distribution (Barba & Pivetti 2009; Cynamon
& Fazzari 2013; Debelle 2004). This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
Figure 2 shows that only for the households in the top
10% of the income distribution has the debt‐to‐assets ratio
remained constant over the last 24 years. Whereas the
other households experienced increases in leverage that
ranged from 5% to nearly a 10% increase depending on
the specific income groups. Furthermore, Figure 3 decomposes the balance sheet components of wealthy households and households in the bottom 60% of the income
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FIGURE 1
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Time‐series of household debt and income inequality

distribution. As can be seen, for the top 1% group, 80% of
wealth is held in business equities, financial instruments,
and liquid assets. On the other hand, the three components represent less than 25% of wealth for the bottom
60% of households. Roughly two‐thirds of their wealth is
in housing, with correspondingly more mortgage debt.
Similarly, Figure 4 shows the composition of household
wealth for the middle three quintiles of the income distribution. As can be seen, most wealth for lower earning
families was held in housing.
Thus, it has been suggested that high debt levels have
restrained the upward income mobility of indebted households. Intuitively, as lower earning households devoted
more and more of their earnings to mortgages and mortgage payments, it implies they have had less and less
income available for productive investments in nonhousing activities, hindering their upward income mobility.
Kumhof and Ranciere (2013) provide a rigorous theoretical framework linking income inequality and household
debt‐to‐income ratios. The mechanism is that those at
the top of the income distribution use a substantial percentage of their income to generate financial wealth

FIGURE 2 Leverage ratio by household income percentile
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

through loans to those at lower levels of the income distribution. Iacoviello (2008), using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, shows that income inequality has
primarily been increased by an expansion of credit from
rich (saving) to poor (spending) households. Saez (2016)
suggests that large increases in debt for households in
the bottom 90% of the income distribution implies that
these households have been saving 0% of their income
over the last 30 years. However, the top wealth holders
have saved significantly, in part because their incomes
have increased so much that they can afford to save large
shares of their incomes. The result is a large increase in
wealth inequality that is likely to persist.
Thus, given the significance of household debt for the
overall state of the economy and its suggestive role in
driving disparities in the income distribution, this paper
examines how the distribution of income, household debt,
and subsequent economic conditions are interrelated in a
dynamic setting. The relationship is examined after controlling for changes in tax rates for individual incomes at
the highest bracket.
The yield spread is used as a proxy for capturing subsequent economic conditions. It is a leading business
cycle indicator and, historically, the slope of the yield
curve (which is the yield spread) has been a reliable predictor of economic conditions that economists have consistently used to calculate the probability of recession
(Bikbov & Chernov 2010; Estrella & Hardouvelis 1991;
Estrella & Mishkin 1998; Moneta 2005). During time
periods in which the economy is expected to perform well,
the yield spread will be higher than in time periods in
which economic performance is expected to be poor.
Figure 5 displays the yield spread, the difference between
long‐ and short‐term government interest rates, over
much of the last century along with National Bureau of
Economic Research recession dates highlighted in grey.
The spread contracts before each economic downturn,
including the recession beginning in 2007.
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FIGURE 3

Composition of household
balance sheets, 2010 [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE 4

Household wealth: Middle
three quintiles [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE 5

Variation of yield spread
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The empirical analysis is performed using Diebold and
Yilmaz's (2012) generalized variance decompositions and
Koop, Pesaran, and Potter's (1996) generalized impulse
responses. To ensure that the vector autoregression
(VAR) contains all relevant information, Forni and
Gambetti's (2014) VAR informational sufficiency test is
performed. For robustness, we compare two measures of
income inequality. To ensure structural interpretation of
the estimated VARs, Choleski factorizations of the shocks
are also calculated. To preview, our results show that subsequent improvements in economic conditions correspond with increases in top income shares, resulting in
increases in income inequality. Likewise, increases in
household debt lead to increasing income inequality but
the effect is short‐lived. However, as household debt and
income inequality increase, the yield spread contracts,
which suggests inversion of the yield curve. Literature
has documented that an inverted yield curve signals economic contraction or lower economic growth in the near
future. The results are consistent across two different measures of income inequality and the methods applied. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data. Section 3 describes the empirical method.
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.

2 | DATA
The yield spread is defined as the difference between the
long‐term interest rate (10 years) from Robert Shiller's
website1 and the 1‐month Treasury bill rates from the
Wharton Research Data Services database. For robustness, the yield spread is also defined as the difference
between the Moody's Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond
Yield from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
database and 1‐month Treasury bill rates.

FIGURE 6

Income shares of top income groups

The annual measure of household debt data was taken
from Philippon (2014). Debt is defined as the level of
household debt normalized by output. The annual data
used for the measures of inequality were obtained from
The World Top Income Database due to its relatively long
time‐series. Piketty and Saez (2001) give a detailed description on how the top income shares are estimated. The top
income shares are based on tax returns data published by
the Internal Revenue Service. The income definition they
use is a gross income definition including all the income
items reported on tax returns (prior to deductions): salaries
and wages, small business and farm income, partnership
and fiduciary income, dividends, interest, rents, royalties,
capital gains, and other small items reported as other
income. Then, the income shares are estimated by dividing
the income amounts accruing to each top fractile by total
personal income computed from the National Accounts.
Figure 6 shows the share of total income going to the
top decile group. Interestingly, most of the growth in the
income shares within the top decile is due to large
changes in the top centile. The “10–1%” income group
measures the income shares of the top decile, excluding
the top 1%. Note that we do not see large changes in the
income share of this group over time. The “10–1%” share
increased from 24.6% in 1980 to 26.2% in 2007. On the
other hand, the income share of the top 1% increased from
10% to 23.5% over the same period. Within the top 1%
group, it is the top 0.1% that has experienced the biggest
increase in income. We believe that analysing income
inequality in terms of the evolution of income shares for
the groups at the top end of the income distribution is better than using the most common measure of income
inequality, the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is
more sensitive to changes in the lower to middle income
groups. If these groups have seen relatively little movement in income/wealth over broad sections of time, then
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this measure may not fully capture changes at the top of
the income distribution.
The first measure of income inequality used is the
Theil index, a measure that captures the discrepancies
between the distribution of income and the distribution
of population between groups of individuals. If all population groups have an income share equal to their population share, the overall Theil index is zero. For
instance, the top 1% of earners would get 1% of income
and the bottom 99% of earners would get 99% of the
income. As such, the index for the top 1% was constructed as follows:


T ¼ I top1 ×I top1 −N top1  þ I b99 ×jI b99 −N b99 j;

(1)

where the I's indicate the income share of the various
income percentiles and the N's indicate the size of the
respective percentiles (here, they would simply be 0.01
and 0.99). Additionally, the Inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient (IPAR), which measures income inequality between
the top 1% and 0.1% of income earners is used as a second
income inequality measure (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez
2011; Piketty & Saez 2001). Changes in taxes matter for
income distribution. Thus, in the model, we include the
variation of tax rates for individual income at the highest
bracket. The data are obtained from the FRED database.
The sample period analysed is from 1927 to 2011.

3 | M O D E L SP E C IF IC AT I O N AN D
E M P I R I C A L RE S U L T S
3.1 | VAR informational sufficiency test
Next, the procedure outlined in Forni and Gambetti (2014)
is implemented in order to ensure that the VARs estimated
are informationally sufficient. As noted in Forni and
Gambetti (2014), a necessary requirement for innovation
accounting is that the variables used within the VAR convey all pertinent information. The testing procedure is
composed of the following three steps. First, obtain a large
data set2 X *t , containing all relevant information. Second,
set a maximum number of factors, P, and compute the first
P principal components. Third, undertake a multivariate
Granger causality test to see if the principal components
Granger cause Z *t (the variables of interest in the VAR); if
the null hypothesis of no Granger causality is not rejected,
TABLE 1

Z *t (the VAR) is informationally sufficient, otherwise sufficiency is rejected. If sufficiency is rejected, Forni and
Gambetti (2014) recommend estimating a factor‐augmented
vector autoregression with the P principal components
added to the original VAR.
As such, the following 4‐variable VAR (p) model is
considered
p

Z t ¼ ∑ Φi Z t−p þ εt

(2)

i¼1

such that Z ′t = [yst, ΔDebtt, Δtaxratet, ΔInequalityt] where
yst, ΔDebtt, Δtaxratet, ΔInequalityt are the yield spread,
household debt, the income tax rate for the highest
bracket, and the two inequality measures considered.
ε~(0, Σ) is a vector of independent and identically distributed error terms. In order to test for informational sufficiency in (2), a set of principal components from a
sufficiently large macroeconomic data set, X *t , are needed.
Accordingly, 57 macroeconomic and financial annual
time‐series were obtained from the FRED database for
the 1927 to 2011 time period.3 The principal components
were obtained using the @princomp procedure in the
RATS software and a maximum of four principal components was set.
Table 1 displays the Granger causality tests of the principal components on the variables in (2). As can be seen,
the principal components from X *t do not Granger cause
the variables in Z *t for both income inequality measures,
indicating that the VAR is informationally sufficient.
Thus, we are confident that our estimated VARs are informationally sufficient to undertake innovation accounting.
Additionally, unit root tests for all variables were undertaken to ensure that the order of integration is the same
before estimating the VAR. All variables are in stationary
form.4

3.2 | Generalized impulse responses and
generalized variance decompositions
Although the above Forni and Gambetti (2014) test allows
one to be confident regarding the informational sufficiency of our VARs, there was no a priori knowledge
regarding the ordering of the variables in Equation 2.
Koop et al. (1996) developed generalized impulse

Forni and Gambetti (2014) informational sufficiency tests

Null hypothesis of no Granger causality

F‐test (significance tests in parentheses)
PC = 1

Principal components (top 1% Theil index)

18.920 (0.272)

Principal components (inverted Pareto coef.)

18.308 (0.306)
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response functions, but, more recently, Diebold and
Yilmaz (2012) build upon Koop et al. (1996) and develop
forecast error decompositions that are invariant to the
variable ordering. As noted in Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012), the variance decompositions allow one to assess
the fraction of the H‐step‐ahead error variance in forecasting zi that is due to shocks to zj, ∀j ≠ i, for each i. As such,
both Koop et al. (1996) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) are
implemented in order to generate generalized impulse
response functions and generalized variance decompositions. We subsequently estimate a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) using a Choleski decomposition
for robustness. The lag length of the VAR was selected
using the AIC and BIC that both suggested one lag.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) define the own variance
shares as the fraction of the H‐step‐ahead error variances
in forecasting zi that are due to shocks to zi for i = 1,2, …
…, N and cross variance shares as the fraction of the H‐
step‐ahead error variances in forecasting zi that are due
to shocks to zij for i,j = 1,2, … …, N such that i ≠ j. The
Koop et al. (1996) H‐step‐ahead forecast error variance
decompositions are
θgij ðH Þ

2
H−1  ′
σ −1
jj ∑h¼0 ei Ah ∑ej
¼
;
H−1 
∑h¼0 e′i Ah ∑A′h ei

(3)

where ∑ is the variance matrix for the error vector ε,
σjj is the standard deviation of the error term for the
jth equation, and ei is the selection vector, with 1 as
the ith element and zeros otherwise. Because the sum
of the elements in each row of the variance decomposition table need not equal 1, Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012) normalize each entry in the variance decomposition matrix by:
e g ðH Þ ¼
θ
ij

θgij ðH Þ
N

∑
j¼1

(4)

θgij ðH Þ

N

such that by construction, ∑ e
θ gij ðH Þ ¼ 1. Diebold and
j¼1

Yilmaz (2012) then use the volatility contributions
from the above generalized variance decomposition to
construct the total spillover index as:
N eij ðH Þ
i≠ j∑i; j¼1 θ
*100:
S ðH Þ ¼
N
g

g

(5)

Thus, the total spillover index measures the contribution of volatility shocks across the four variables in our
VAR to the total forecast error variance. Diebold and
Yilmaz (2012) subsequently layout directional volatility
spillovers that provide a decomposition of the total

spillovers to those coming from (or to) a particular variable. The volatility spillover by variable i to all other variables j is
N eij ðH Þ
i≠ j∑j¼1 θ
g
Si· ðH Þ ¼
*100:
N
g

(6)

Similarly, the directional volatility spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j is
N eji ðH Þ
j≠i∑j¼i θ
g
*100:
S·i ðH Þ ¼
N
g

(7)

The net spillover from variable i to all other variables j is
Sgi ðH Þ ¼ Sg·i ðH Þ−Sgi· ðH Þ:

(8)

The net pairwise volatility spillovers are defined as
Sgi ðH Þ ¼

e
θgij ðH Þ
θgji ðH Þ−e
N

*100:

(9)

4 | R E SUL T S
4.1 | Generalized impulse response
functions
This section discusses the generalized impulse response
functions from estimating (2). For ease of exposition, the
generalized impulse responses are standardized and
cumulated. Figures 7 and 8 display the results involving
the responses of the two income inequality measures,
IPAR and the top 1% Thiel index.
The findings suggest that increases in the yield spread
have a strong impact on income inequality. Specifically, a
one standard deviation increase in the yield spread corresponds with a 0.5 standard deviation increase in income
inequality, as measured by IPAR, and a 0.8 standard deviation increase in income inequality, as defined by the top
1% Thiel index. It suggests that subsequent improvements
in economic conditions mainly benefits households at the
top end of the income distribution. Note, increases in the
yield spread correspond with the Federal Reserve initiating
expansionary monetary policy. Thus, the results indicate
that expansionary monetary policy is more beneficial for
households at the top end of the income distribution. This
should not be seen as a surprise, as wealthy households
have better access to capital markets and take advantage
of low cost credit to invest in equities and other entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, Saez (2013) shows that most
of the income growth during the 3 years following the
Great Recession went to top income earners.

BERISHA AND MESZAROS
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FIGURE 7

Responses of income inequality using IPAR as the income inequality measure. IPAR = inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient

FIGURE 8

Responses of income inequality using top 1% Thiel index as the income inequality measure

The results show supporting evidence for the hypothesis
that changes in household debt have an effect on the distribution of income. The findings hold only for the income
inequality measure defined using the top 1% Thiel index.
Again, the index captures the income disparity between
the bottom 99% and top 1% of income earners. In Section
1, it was shown that households lower in the income distribution experienced the largest increases in debt relative to
their income. As such, the findings reveal that debt has hindered income mobility of the indebted households.
Figures 9 and 10 display the generalized impulse
responses of household debt. Increases in the yield spread
correspond with subsequent increases in household debt.
Thus, the results show supporting evidence that expectations about the future matter for household indebtedness.
Specifically, it can be said that expected improvements in
economic conditions correspond with increases in household debt. Per one standard deviation increase in the yield

spread, household debt increases by approximately one
standard deviation. Overall, from the empirical findings
presented so far, it can be suggested that expectations about
future growth have contributed to household indebtedness,
further exacerbating the unequal distribution of income.
Figures 11 and 12 display the generalized impulse
responses of the tax rates for the incomes at the highest
bracket. As can be seen, none of the other variables in
the model have any statistically significant effect on variations in the tax rate.
Figures 13 and 14 display the generalized impulse
responses of the yield spread. Results indicate that the
upsurges in household debt and income inequality invert
the yield curve over time, which means that short‐term rates
(1‐month Treasury bills) rise more than the long‐term rates
(10‐year Treasury bonds). Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in household debt leads the yield spread to contract by two standard deviations. Similarly, a one standard
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FIGURE 9
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Responses of household debt using IPAR as the income inequality measure. IPAR = inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient

FIGURE 10

Responses of household debt using top 1% Thiel index as the income inequality measure

FIGURE 11

Responses of top tax rate using IPAR as the income inequality measure. IPAR = inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient

BERISHA AND MESZAROS

FIGURE 12

Responses of top tax rate using top 1% Thiel as the income inequality measure

FIGURE 13

Responses of yield spread using IPAR as the income inequality measure. IPAR = inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient

FIGURE 14

Responses of yield spread using top 1% Thiel as the income inequality measure
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deviation increase in income inequality corresponds with a
one standard deviation contraction in the yield spread. The
results are consistent across the two income inequality measures. Historically, a strongly inverted yield curve (contraction in the yield spread) precedes economic recession.
Thus, the findings indicate that upsurges in household debt
and income inequality contribute to slowing economic
growth. This corresponds with the recent findings of Mian
et al. (2015), who find that increases in household debt correspond with subsequent decreases in economic growth.

BERISHA AND MESZAROS

It should be noted that the presented findings remain
very similar even when the yield spread is defined as the
difference between Moody's Seasoned AAA Corporate
Bond Yield and 1‐month Treasury bill rates. To ensure
structural interpretation of the estimated impulse
responses, the Choleski factorization is also implemented
in the order: yield spread, household debt, tax rate, and
income inequality. The estimated orthogonalized impulse
responses are very similar to the generalized impulse
responses presented above.5

FIGURE 15 Variance decompositions using IPAR as the income inequality measure. IPAR = inverted Pareto–Lorenz coefficient [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

FIGURE 16

Variance decompositions using top 1% Thiel index as the income inequality measure [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

BERISHA AND MESZAROS

4.2 | Generalized variance decompositions
Figure 15 displays the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) generalized variance decompositions using IPAR as the measure
of income inequality.
Variations in expected economic conditions, as captured by the yield spread, explain 17% of the variation in
income disparity among the top income earners. Also,
almost 15% of variation in household debt is contributed
to the yield spread. The results again confirm the significance of household debt and income inequality in driving
future economic conditions. Specifically, 30% of variation
in the yield spread is attributed to changes in income
inequality and household debt.
As presented in Figure 16, the results are very similar
when the top 1% Thiel index is used as the income
inequality measure. Almost 20% of variation in the
income disparity between the top 1% and bottom 99% of
income earners and 14% of variation in household debt
is explained by the yield spread. Again, approximately
30% of variation in the yield spread is attributed to household debt and income inequality. It provides some reassurance that household debt and income inequality
matter for the subsequent changes in economic
conditions.

5 | CONCLUSION
Recently, thanks to work by Thomas Piketty (2014),
inequality has come to the forefront of economic study.
In addition, increases in household debt levels have been
tied to economic stagnation and recessions by Mian et al.
(2015) and many others. Also, in the past, many authors
have linked decreasing yield spreads with poor future economic performance (Bikbov & Chernov 2010; Estrella &
Hardouvelis 1991; Estrella & Mishkin 1998; Moneta
2005). Using VARs and an additional method to test that
the VARs are informationally sufficient developed by
Forni and Gambetti (2014), we link household debt,
inequality, and the yield spread. Our main contribution
is that we find that increases in the yield spread, which
correspond with improving economic conditions, mainly
benefit households at the top end of the income distribution. Also note that during economic expansions, monetary policy is usually expansionary, and, thus,
expansionary monetary policy corresponds with increasing income inequality. In addition, we find that increases
in the aggregate amount of household debt increase
income inequality, although the effect dies out after
roughly 2 years. Last, we find that increases in both
household debt and income inequality lead to contractions in the yield spread. This indicates that if household
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debt and/or inequality is increasing in a given country,
then this bodes ill for the future, as contractions in the
yield spread predict future economic weakness and
recessions.
ENDN OTE S
1

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm

2

Variables included in our dataset are included in the appendix.

3

Information on the 57 time series used may be obtained upon request of the
authors. All variables were pretested for unit roots before obtaining the
principal components.

4

Unit root test results may be obtained upon request of the authors.

5

To save space, we do not report the impulse responses under the alternative
specification of the yield spread and the Choleski factorization but they are
available upon request. Also, the reported findings are consistent across different ordering of the variables.
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A P P EN D I X 1
List of variables included in the principal component
analysis.
TOPTAX – top marginal tax rate in US, IRS
AMTR – average marginal tax rate in US, Barro
OUTNFB – output nonfarm business sector, index
2009 = 100, FRED
RPFIR – real private fixed investment, index
2009 = 100, FRED
RPFINR – real private fixed investment, index
2009 = 100, FRED
RPCE – real personal consumption expenditure,
chained 2009 dollars, FRED
RPCEDG – real personal consumption expenditure,
index 2009 = 100, FRED
RPCENDG – real personal consumption expenditure,
index 2009 = 100, FRED
RGCEND – real government consumption expenditure, national defence, index 2009 = 100, FRED
RGCEF – real government consumption expenditure,
federal, index 2009 = 100, FRED

RCPI – real change in private inventories, chained
2009 dollars, FRED
REXP – real exports of goods and services, chained
2009 dollars, FRED
RIMP – real imports of goods and services, chained
2009 dollars, FRED
CPROF – corporate business: Profits before tax (without IVA and CCAdj), billions of dollars, FRED
CNCASH – Corporate cash flow: Net cash flow with
IVA, billions of dollars, FRED
HOURS – Nonfarm business sector: Hours of all persons, index 2009 = 100, FRED
ROPH – Nonfarm business sector: Real output per
hour of all persons, index 2009 = 100, FRED
NFULC – Nonfarm business sector: Unit labor cost,
index 2009 = 100, FRED
NFRCPH – Nonfarm business sector: Real compensation per hour, index 2009 = 100, FRED
RGDP – Real gross domestic product, chained 2009
dollars, FRED
IPBE – Industrial production: Business equipment,
index 2007 = 100, FRED
IPCONS – Industrial production: Consumer goods,
index 2007 = 100, FRED
IPMAT – Industrial production: Materials, index
2007 = 100, FRED
CEMP – Civilian employment, thousands of persons,
FRED
AVEH – Average weekly hours of production and
nonsupervisory employees: Manufacturing, hours, FRED
UNEMP – Unemployed, thousands of persons, FRED
DUNEMP – Average (mean) duration of unemployment, weeks, FRED
CUNEMP – Civilian unemployment rate, percent,
FRED
HSTART – Housing starts: Total: New privately
owned housing units started, thousands of units, FRED
THREETR – 3‐month treasury bill: Secondary market
rate, percent, FRED
TENTR – 10‐Year treasury constant maturity rate,
percent, FRED
AAA – Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield,
percent, FRED
BAA – Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield,
percent, FRED
MONE – M1 money stock, billions of dollars, FRED
MTWO – M2 money stock, billions of dollars, FRED
BUSLOANS – Commercial and industrial loans, all
commercial banks
CONSUMER – Consumer loans at all commercial
banks
CPIAUCSL – Consumer price index for all urban consumers: All items
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CPILFESL – Consumer price index for all urban consumers: All items less food & energy
PPICPE – Producer price index: Finished goods: Capital equipment
PPIFCG – Producer price index: Finished consumer
goods
PPIFGS – Producer price index: Finished goods
GCEC1 – Real government consumption expenditures & gross investment
NTU – Number of tax units, Piketty, world top
incomes
NTR – Number of tax returns, Piketty, world top
incomes
AIPTU – average income per tax unit, Piketty, world
top incomes
TOPTENAI – top 10% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
TOPFIVEAI – top 5% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
TOPONEAI – top 1% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
PFIVEAI – top 0.5% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
PONEAI – top 0.1% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
PZONEAI – top 0.01% average income, Piketty, world
top incomes
BNINEAI – bottom 90% average income, Piketty,
world top incomes
E_FINSHV – financial sector GDP share, Phillipon
E_FINSHVND – financial sector share GDP no
defence, Phillipon
e_finshv_ndnf – financial sector share GDP no
defence no farm, Phillipon
e_finshv_ndnf_dom – financial sector share GDP
domestic, Phillipon
finf_hh – debt flow households, Phillipon
CORB – gross corporate bond issuance, Phillipon
e_mveg – total equity market value/GDP, Phillipon
es_ipog – IPO proceeds/GDP, Phillipon
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es_stkig – Gross(non‐fin) offerings/GDP, Phillipon
depog_hh – household deposits (Spliced), Phillipon
depog_nonhh – corporate and government deposits
(Spliced), Phillipon
finf_all – aggregate output of financial industry flow
measure, Phillipon
finfl_all – aggregate output of financial industry level
measure, Phillipon
fin_bus – business credit and equity, Phillipon
fin_hh – household credit, Phillipon
fin_m – liquidity services, Phillipon
fin_merg – mergers and acquisitions, Phillipon
fincostma – unadjusted financial cost of intermediation composite based, Phillipon
finlcostma – unadjusted financial cost of intermediation level based, Phillipon
HPI – Real home price index, index 1949 = 100,
Shiller
RBCI – Real building cost index, index 1979 = 100,
Shiller
RP – Real price S&P 500, Shiller
LONG – Long interest rate, Shiller
RD – Real dividends, Shiller
RE – Real earnings, Shiller
CAPE – Cyclically adjusted price earnings ratio,
Shiller
RC – Real personal consumption expenditure billions
of 2005 dollars, Shiller
TGCGD – Total gross central government debt,
Reinhart and Rogoff
RRI – Inflation, annual percent change, Reinhart and
Rogoff
IPMANSICN – Industrial production: Manufacturing
(SIC)
FYONET – Federal net outlays
FYFR – Federal receipts
PPIACO – Producer price index: All commodities
PPIIDC – Producer price index: Industrial
commodities
Gini – Gini coefficient, Frank
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